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I. INTRODUCTION
For well over two centuries, the law has exalted the "reasonable man
of ordinary prudence," a purely mythical person who never acts or fails
to act without an appropriate measure of prudence and caution.' In-
deed, the law has required all persons to either conform to the stan-
dards of conduct exhibited by this fictitious reasonable person or pay
for the damages resulting from the failure to so conform. This require-
ment of conforming to the standards of the "reasonable man" has pro-
vided an amazingly stable foundation on which much of the law of
torts has been built.
The "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" concept has served its
function well in the all too common situations where someone is in-
jured because another person fails to look where he is going, fails to
maintain his property, or otherwise acts without prudence and caution
in the ordinary course of events. In the ever-expanding and complex
field of medicine, however, defining the attributes of a "reasonable
physician" has become increasingly difficult. Determining whether a
particular act by a physician breaches the standards of a reasonable
physician is often a difficult question even for those trained in
medicine.
Because lay juries are not trained in determining how a reasonable
person in a technical field, such as medicine, would act, the law has
generally required plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care by which a
defendant-doctor's conduct may be measured.2 Thus, a plaintiff must
1. Professor Prosser attributes the origin of the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" to
Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1738). W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
ToRTs 150 n.16 (4th ed. 1971).
2. A thorough discussion of the general requirement of producing expert testimony on tech-
nical, scientific and medical matters and the problems arising therefrom is found in Morris, The
Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1947). The cases
applying the general requirement to medical negligence claims are collected in Annot., 40
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establish by expert testimony what standards or procedures a reason-
able physician under the circumstances would follow. If a plaintiff fails
to produce such testimony, he will have failed to establish aprimafacie
case and the action will be dismissed.
The general rule requiring expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases to establish the applicable standard of care is extremely harsh in
those cases where the plaintiff's alleged injuries have resulted from con-
duct that would be expected to fall within the sphere of knowledge
common to lay persons. Additional objections to the rule arise where
institutional restraints limit the availability of experts to testify. The
inequities that would result from a blind and absolute application of
the expert testimony requirement in medical malpractice cases has re-
sulted in the so-called "common knowledge" exception to the require-
ment: "[w]here the matter is regarded as within the common
knowledge of laymen, as where the surgeon saws off the wrong leg, or
there is injury to a part of the body not within the operative field, it has
been held that the jury may infer negligence without the aid of an ex-
pert."3 This "common knowledge" exception to the general rule re-
quiring expert testimony establishing the standard of care is simply a
common sense recognition that there may be cases that so blatantly
deviate from the expected standard of conduct that establishment of the
precise standard by expert testimony is unnecessary.
While there has been little dispute over the theoretical basis for the
use of common knowledge in medical malpractice actions, an ever-in-
creasing sphere of judicially recognized "common knowledge"4 raises
A.L.R.3d 515 (1971) (claims against hospitals) and Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962) (claims against
physicians). For a representative sample of such cases, see, e.g., Phillips v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147,
99 P.2d 104 (1940); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn.
482, 150 A. 516 (1930); Hogmire v. Voita, 319 II. App. 644, 49 N.E.2d 811 (1943); Treptau v.
Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W.2d 108 (1945) cited in Comment, Medical Malpractce-
Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 834, 834 n.l (1966).
3. PROSSER, supra note I, at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
4. See D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES §14.02 (1977
& 1979 Supp.). See also infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
The use of radiation in medical treatment is a good example of the expanding realm of common
knowledge. Early cases involving radiation treatment held that such treatments were outside the
scope of common knowledge. This early approach is typified by Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944,
946 (E.D. Va. 1960), wherein the court stated that "[tihe standard for the measure of skill exer-
cised by the physician or surgeon [in the use of x-ray treatment] should not ... be left to the
whim or caprice of a jury, or trier of fact upon non-expert evidence." In Dietze, the court took
notice of the fact that "in the treatment of cancer and other diseases it is often necessary to use x-
ray extensively" and asserted that haphazard application of the common knowledge rule or the res
0sa loquitur doctrine in this context "would do violence to the medical profession and subject
practitioners to a handicap too hazardous to carry." 184 F. Supp. at 946. Before too long, how-
ever, the tide shifted and courts began to hold that injuries resulting from radiation treatment
were within the sphere of common knowledge. For example, in ZeBarth v. Swedish Medical
Center, 81 Wash.2d 11, 499 P.2d 1, (1972), the court held that "high voltage radiation in the
treatment of cancer has been widely enough and long enough employed in this country to allow
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important questions about the limits of the doctrine.5 Moreover, in re-
cent years, the use of common knowledge in medical malpractice ac-
tions has become intertwined inextricably with an expanded use of res
Opsa loquitur,6 which allows the finder of fact in a negligence action to
infer or presume negligence from the mere fact of injury.7 The mar-
riage of these two doctrines further warrants a review of both their un-
derlying justifications and their proper application to specific cases.
This article will examine the justifications for the use of common
knowledge in medical malpractice litigation, its relationship to the res
#7sa loquitur doctrine, and the joint application of the common knowl-
edge and res #isa loquitur doctrines. After concluding that the doc-
trines are inadequate tools for remedying a perceived wall of silence
within the medical profession and that they have been improperly ap-
plied, the article will propose methods of dealing directly with the wall
of silence while retaining consistent and logical use of common knowl-
edge in medical malpractice litigation.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
There appear to be two separate and distinct strands of analysis that
are advanced to justify a retreat from the usual burden placed on medi-
cal malpractice plaintiffs in establishing the applicable standard of care
by expert testimony. The first strand of analysis involves what I would
label "the blatant blunder cases": cases in which lay judges and juries
are allowed to weigh the propriety and skill of a doctor without the
assistance of expert testimony because of blatant blunders in the ren-
dering of medical care. Cases in which a medical practitioner "treats"
the jury to find that, within the experience and observation of mankind, myelopathy or paralysis
ordinarily will not result from its use . 5..." 81 Wash 2d at 20, 499 P.2d at 7.
5. For a highly critical review of some of the cases expanding the use of common knowledge
in medical malpractice actions, see Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malprac-
tice Lax-Expanding a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REV. 251 (1962).
6. Res isa loquitur, which means "the thing speaks for itself," first appeared in Byrme v.
Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). In that case, a pedestrian was struck and injured
by a barrel of flour that fell out of a warehouse window. In the pedestrian's action against the
warehouse owner, the court held that "[a] presumption of negligence can arise from the occur-
rence of the accident itself." 2 H. & C. at 728; 159 Eng. Rep. at 301. Modem cases generally
apply the doctrine if three conditions are met: (1) the event that resulted in the injury must be of a
type that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the event must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality of the defendant; and (3) the event must not have occurred
because of any voluntary action of the plaintiff. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 214.
7. Professor Prosser notes that modem common knowledge cases "usually involve the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur." PROSSER, supra note 1, at 165 n.62. See also King, In Search of a
Standard of Carefor the MedicalProfession: The "A ccepted Practice"Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV.
1213, 1257-1261 (1975) ("The common knowledge principle finds its widest application in con-
junction with the doctrine of res 0sa loquitur, which is based upon an assumption that the negli-
gence may be circumstantially inferred from the nature of the resulting injury.")
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the wrong part of a patient's body8 or in which a foreign object is left in
a patient's body after surgery9 are the classic examples of such cases.
The second strand of analysis in the common knowledge cases relies
on policy justifications that support a relaxation of the general rule
necessitating expert testimony to establish the standard of care in all
technical and scientific matters. The most frequently cited policy justi-
fication is the reluctance of doctors to testify against each other in mal-
practice actions.' ° Because of this often noted reluctance, courts and
commentators have argued that the requirement of producing expert
testimony on medical matters places a nearly insurmountable obstacle
in the path of most would-be malpractice plaintiffs.It There have also
been references to other institutional barriers, such as the traditional
locality rule,'" that combine to exacerbate the problem of obtaining
competent and qualified expert medical witnesses. Because the two
strands of analysis in common knowledge cases are fundamentally dif-
ferent, a separate evaluation of each is merited.
A. Blatant Blunders
The simplest cases for application of the common knowledge rule are
those cases where extreme departures from accepted medical practices,
as understood by the community at large, are known, alleged and
8. See, e.g., Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J.Super. 67, 107 A.2d 825 (1954) (dentist pulls the wrong
tooth).
9. See, e.g., Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956)
(clamp left in abdomen after operation); Jefferson v. U.S., 77 F. Supp. 706 (1948) (towel left in
abdomen after operation); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) (sponge left in abdomen
after operation).
10. See, e.g., Haldin v. Peterson, 39 Wis.2d 668, 159 N.W.2d 738 (1968); Morgan v. Rosen-
berg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1963); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ., 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Simon v. Freidrich, 163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y.S. 367 (1937). For a review of the com-
mentary on the subject, see Kayajanian, Confronting the Conspiracy of Silence: We Have a Tiger
by the Tail, 6 U. WEST. L.A. L. REv. 40 (1974); Kelner, The Silent Doctors-The Conspiracy of
Silence, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 119 (1970); Comment, Medical Malpractice-The 'locality Rule" and
the "Conspiracy of Silence," 22 S.C.L. REv. 810 (1970); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and
the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 158 (1966); Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony,
77 HARv. L. REV. 333 (1963); Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence Statutory and Com-
mon-law Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REv. 1019 (1961). The traditional reluctance of medical profes-
sionals to testify against each other was first indicted as a "conspiracy" by Melvin Belli in his
stinging criticism of medical malpractice law, Belli, An Ancient Therapy StillApplied." The Silent
Medical Treatment, I VILL. L. REv. 250 (1956).
11. The earliest and most vocal criticism of medical doctors' unwillingness to testify in mal-
practice actions came from judicial "champions of plaintiffs rights," see, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons,
66 Cal.2d 399, 416 n.3, 426 P.2d 525, 537, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 137 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring);
Demchuk v. Bralow, 404 Pa. 100, 107, 170 A.2d 868, 872 (1961) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) cited
in King, supra note 7, at 1257 n.178; and from the plaintiffs bar, see, e.g., Belli, supra note 10,
Belli, Ready for the Plaintiffi, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 408 (1957).
12. The "locality rule," now abandoned or relaxed in most jurisdictions, required "that a
medical witness, in order to qualify as an expert, [had to] be a practicing physician in the same
community as the defendant." Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REv. 333,
338 (1963) (footnote omitted). This rule is discussed more fully in the text and notes at infra notes
72-75.
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proven. In such cases, it is still admitted that a lay jury would not
know the precise standard of care required by a reasonable physician
under the circumstances; but some actions are deemed to be so far from
any acceptable standard of care that the jury's ignorance of the precise
standard is not relevant. Therefore, lay juries have "common knowl-
edge" that an extreme departure has occurred, but do not have "com-
mon knowledge" of the procedures or standards that would be
employed by a reasonable physician.
A good example of this type of case is Jeerson v. United States.'3 In
that case, the plaintiff alleged and proved that prior to being released
from military service he underwent an abdominal operation for gall
bladder trouble in a government hospital at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
The plaintiff further alleged and proved that the operation was per-
formed by an Army medical officer. Some eight months later, after
complaining of severe abdominal pain, the plaintiff underwent another
abdominal operation performed by a civilian doctor. In the course of
the second operation, the doctor discovered a towel "in the lower part
of the plaintiff's stomach which had partly worked into the duode-
num.' 4 The. civilian doctor removed the towel, which was 30 inches
long by 18 inches wide and bore the inscription "Medical Department
U.S. Army." In deciding the plaintiffs malpractice claim against the
first doctor and the government, the court recognized the theoretical
possibility that the plaintiff had swallowed the towel'5 but nonetheless
had little difficulty in finding that the towel must have been placed in
the plaintiffs abdomen at the time of the first operation and that the
failure to remove it constituted negligence. 16
Cases such as Jefferson, where a foreign object is alleged to have
been left in the patient's body during surgery, constitute the most
widely recognized category of common knowledge cases. Judges and
juries in these cases are able to decide the negligence issue without the
assistance of expert testimony because it is assumed that everyone
knows "it is not the practice in the community for competent surgeons
to leave a sponge [or other foreign object] in the operative wound fol-
lowing an open operation."' 7
In addition to the cases involving foreign objects left in a patient's
body, several other categories of "blatant blunders" have developed.
13. 77 F. Supp. 706.
14. Id at 709.
15. Id
16. Id at 710. However, the court went on to hold that the injury to the plaintiff was a
"service-connected disability," and therefore not actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id at 711.
17. Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 947 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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For example, cases in which the doctor treats the wrong part of the
body,' 8 and cases in which a fairly harmless instrument causes an obvi-
ous injury, such as a hot water bottle causing a serious burn, 9 have
been held to be within the common knowledge exception to the re-
quirement of producing expert medical testimony. These cases have
been accepted for the same reasons as the "foreign objects" cases; there
are some acts that appear so obviously contrary to a general under-
standing of common aspects of medical treatment that a layperson can
pass judgment on them without expert testimony.2°
The important characteristic of these so-called "blatant blunder"
cases is that they involve known, alleged and proven acts that appear
to fall so far below any acceptable standard of care that it is unneces-
sary to require expert testimony to establish the precise standard of
care. In these cases, common knowledge is allowed to establish a
deviation from the standard of care while direct proof is used to show
the acts constituting the deviation. Because there is direct proof of neg-
ligence in these cases, they differ from res Osa loquitur cases, where
negligence is inferred or presumed from the simple fact of injury.
Nearly everyone would agree that there is good reason to deviate
from the general rule requiring expert medical testimony in these bla-
tant blunder cases. As a matter of theory, expert testimony is necessary
only to the extent that a jury is uninformed of the proper standard of
care and since a jury has some general understanding of the standard in
these cases, expert testimony is not necessary. As a practical matter, it
would be extremely inefficient to require expert testimony on some
questions, such as whether it is good medical practice to leave equip-
ment inside a body after an operation. Although there are lines to be
drawn, the common knowledge doctrine, as based on blatant blunder
cases, is a justified and workable exception to the general rule requiring
expert testimony in all technical and medical matters.
B. The Conspiracy of Silence
1. Common knowledge cases. Aside from the cases involving bla-
tant blunders in medical treatment, there are numerous cases and con-
siderable commentary that focus on policy factors supporting
18. See, e.g., Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J.Super. 67, 107 A.2d 825 (1954) (dentist pulls the wrong
tooth).
19. See, e.g., Trimbrell v. Suburban Hospital, 4 Cal.2d 68,47 P.2d 737 (1935) (Patient burned
while unconscious); Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92,33 P.2d 535 (1934) (patient burned during
operation).
20. See, e.g., Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952) (performance of opera-
tion without complete biopsy or diagnosis); Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hospital, Inc., 232 N.C.
362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950) (failure to examine stitches after delivery of child despite patient's com-
plaints of pain).
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relaxation for the general rule requiring expert testimony in technical
and medical matters. The primary focus in the cases and commentary
has been on the reluctance of doctors to testify for medical malpractice
plaintiffs. 2' Both the cases and the commentary recognize that a mal-
practice plaintiffs inability to procure a competent and qualified doctor
to testify will effectively bar the door to the courthouse for the majority
of malpractice claims.
One of the earliest and most powerful indictments of the so-called
"conspiracy of silence" among medical doctors was made by Melvin
Belli.22 Belli's analysis of the medical profession's "conspiracy" con-
sists mostly of first hand experiences. He recites a case in San Fran-
cisco involving a "drunken doctor" who failed to recognize classic
symptoms of appendicitis and allowed the patient's appendix to burst.
Despite all efforts, Belli "couldn't persuade a single one of this drunken
doctor's colleagues to testify to the obvious in court." 3 In fact, accord-
ing to Belli, "[flive doctors testified in [the doctor's] behalf."24 Belli
also refers to a medical malpractice case for which "in the whole state
of Nevada" he "could not find one single doctor who dared testify
against the operating surgeon."2 5 Claims such as these may have moti-
vated one would-be malpractice plaintiff's unsuccessful suit against a
California medical society alleging a conspiracy to deprive her of the
expert medical testimony necessary to sustain her malpractice action. 6
Of course, the conspiracy of silence claim is not entirely one-sided.
It is not altogether clear that medical malpractice plaintiffs are still con-
fronted with all the difficulties in obtaining expert witnesses as Belli
and others have asserted.
Although competent expert witnesses may have been difficult to
come by thirty years ago when Bell's stinging critique was written,
changing attitudes and various reforms have made obtaining necessary
expert testimony much less difficult.2 7 Today's lawyer need only pick
up any issue of the American Bar Association Journal to find access to
21. See the cases and commentary cited in supra note 10.
22. Belli, supra note 11.
23. Id at 409-410.
24. Id
25. Id at 413.
26. See Agnew v. Parks, 172 CaI.App.2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959).
27. See Leonard, Medical Negligence: Perspective on the Coming Decade, 16 FORUM, 403,
403 (1981) ("The last two decades have seen a strong trend toward liberalization and/or erosion of
any rules which would exclude and/or preclude witnesses from offering testimony to establish
appropriate standards of medical practice and deviations from those standards."); Vogel & Del-
gado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians' Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv., 52,
52 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Vogel] ("Developments in tort theory and practice, including
the establishment of national standards for specialists, the creation of common knowledge excep-
tions, and the use of res ipsa loquitur, have done much to overcome the 'wall of silence' that once
made medical malpractice actions such high-risk, low-gain efforts.").
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"450 Board Certified physicians in all specialties, nationwide" that are
available, and even "guaranteed for meritorious cases," for medical
malpractice cases.28
The debate over the asserted difficulty in obtaining competent medi-
cal witnesses cannot be settled here. It is sufficient for purposes of ana-
lyzing the common knowledge doctrine in medical malpractice
litigation to note that the asserted existence of a conspiracy of silence
remains a strong policy justification for a liberal application of the
common knowledge doctrine.
2 Joint application of common knowledge and res 0psa loquitur. The
common knowledge doctrine "finds its widest application in conjunc-
tion with the doctrine of res i'sa loquitur .. ".."'I Res Osa loquitur
allows a trier of fact in certain circumstances3" to infer from the mere
fact of injury that the person who controlled the instrumentality of in-
jury was negligent.3 ' Joint application of common knowledge and res
#7sa loquitur, therefore, allows a jury to infer negligence from an injury
purely on the basis of its common knowledge.
It is increasingly common for cases involving joint applications of
common knowledge and res #psa loquitur to rely upon the so-called
conspiracy of silence. In the leading case of Ybarra v. Spangard,32 for
example, there are applications of both the common knowledge and res
#7sa loquitur doctrines based upon the conspiracy of silence notion. In
that case, the patient-plaintiff discovered injuries to his shoulder after
undergoing an appendectomy and brought an action against the nurses
and doctors who participated in the operation and against the hospital
where it had been performed. The court, using a typical common
28. 68 A.B.A. J. 373 (1982). Similar advertisements can be found in numerous legal journals
and periodicals. See, e.g., 4 NAT. L.J. No. 30 p. 30 (April 5, 1982).
29. King, supra note 7, at 1258.
30. Res Ipsa Loquitur will generally be applied only if three conditions are met: (1) the event
that resulted in the injury must be of a type that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; (2) the event must be caused by an agency or instrumentality of the defend-
ant; and (3) the event must not have occurred because of any voluntary action of the plaintiff.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 217; see also Comment, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 852 (1966).
31. The procedural result of the application of the res psa loquitur doctrine varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, the doctrine creates an inference of negligence; in
others, it gives rise to a presumption of negligence that must be rebutted by the defendant. See
Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Its Place in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 343,
356-361; Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur: 4 Case For Flexibility in Medical Malpractice, 16 WAYNE
L. REV. 1136, 1146-1151 (1970).
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that define or limit the situations in which res psa
loquitur may be applied to medical malpractice claims. See NEe. REv. STAT. §41A.100; TENN.
CODE ANN. §29-26-115.
32. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
141
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knowledge approach, had little difficulty in finding a breach of the
standard of care:
We have here [a] problem ... of distinct injury to a healthy part of
the body not the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by
the operation. The decisions of this state make it clear that such cir-
cumstances raise the inference of negligence, and call upon the de-
fendant to explain the unusual result . . .33
As for the application of res Opsa loquitur, the defendants argued that
res isa loquitur could not be applied because the plaintiff was unable
to produce proof as to the cause of injury or that the instrumentality of
injury was under the exclusive control of one or more of the defend-
ants. The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that it would
be "manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that [the plaintiff] iden-
tify any one of them as the person who did the alleged negligent act."'34
The court expressly indicated its unwillingness to protect the defend-
ants in their silence and required each of them to either "meet the in-
ference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct" or be
held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.35 Thus, the Ybarra court essen-
tially allowed common knowledge to establish the applicable standard
of care and then allowed res ipsa loquitur to create an inference that the
defendants breached the standard.
Although many recent cases involve both the common knowledge
doctrine and res ipsa loquitur, it is important to recognize that there are
differences in the two doctrines. The common knowledge cases "differ
from standard res ipsa loquitur cases because they involve known, al-
leged, and proven omission[s] '' 36 while res ipsa loquitur cases permit an
inference of negligence from the simple fact of injury.37 Common
knowledge cases allow an inference as to the standard of care but re-
quire proof of a breach of that standard. Res isa loquitur cases gener-
ally require proof of the standard of care but allow a breach of the
established standard of care to be inferred by the fact of injury. The
combined use of these two doctrines allows the jury to establish the
standard of care by their common knowledge and infer a breach of that
standard from the simple fact of injury.
33. Id at 491, 154 P.2d at 690.
34. Id
35. Id at 494, 154 P.2d at 691.
36. Note, supra note 12, at 346.
37. See, e.g., ZeBarth v. Swedish Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 11, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Zentz v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 446, 247 P.2d 344, 349 (1952) ("[A]s a general rule, res .6psa
loquitur applies where ... it can be said, in light of past experience, that [the injury] was the
result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person who is
responsible.").
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III. PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND
RES IPSA4 LoQuruR
The common knowledge doctrine has traditionally been applied in
medical malpractice litigation only where the events in question in-
volve "medical and surgical errors on which any layman is competent
to pass judgment .... "38 Under this analysis, common law develop-
ment has resulted in certain classes of cases being declared subject to
the common knowledge and experience of the lay public-i.e., those
cases where "objects [are] left in the patient's body at the time of sur-
gery and the removal of the wrong part of the body. '39 Similarly, res
lOsa loquitur has traditionally been applied only where three conditions
are met: 1) the event that resulted in the injury must be of a type that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; 2) the
event must be caused by an agency or instrumentality of the defendant;
and 3) the event must not have occurred because of any voluntary ac-
tion of the plaintiff.40
Many modem courts, however, have not felt bound by the tradi-
tional rules governing common knowledge and res ipsa loquitur. There
has been an "increased judicial receptivity toward" the doctrines, 4 t
with many recent cases holding that "lay common knowledge may be
utilized to satisfy the first requirement of res Osa .... -"4 Indeed, it is
generally conceded that the number and types of medical malpractice
cases applying either the common knowledge doctrine or res Opsa loqui-
tur, or both, has multiplied over the last several decades. 43 Some com-
mentators have praised the perceived expansions of the doctrines,'41
while others have been decidedly critical. One commentator has gone
so far as to suggest that the expansion of the doctrines by California
courts has essentially moved the medical profession into the realm of
38. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 227.
39. Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Law, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 691,
693 (1967).
40. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 217.
41. Meisel, The Expansion of Liabilityfor Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Lia-
bility by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 71 (1977).
42. Note, supra note 39, at 693.
43. See C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 244 (3rd
ed. 1977) ("The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has also been extended in recent years to actions
against multiple defendants sued under different substantive theories."); Meisel, supra note 41, at
70 ("Because expert medical testimony is generally a prerequisite to the establishment of the de-
fendant's negligence, a number of jurisdictions have refused to apply res psa loquitur. However,
the overall trend has been toward liberalization of the conditions under which it may be invoked
by a medical-accident victim."); King, supra note 7, at 1258 ("In recent years a tendency has
developed to enlarge the scope of the common knowledge exception to reach ever more complex
factual situations.").
44. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2.
45. See, eg., Rubsamen, supra note 5; Meisel, supra note 41.
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strict liability.46 A review of the modem applications of the common
knowledge doctrine, both by itself and in conjunction with res iosa lo-
quitur, reveals two major problems: an unjustified reliance on the so-
called "conspiracy of silence" and a failure to distinguish between neg-
ligence that falls within the scope of common knowledge and uncom-
mon injuries.
A. The Unjustfied Reliance on the Conspiracy of Silence
The unavailability, or limited availability, of expert medical testi-
mony has often been advanced as a reason for applying the common
knowledge doctrine or res isa loquitur in individual cases. And, in
many instances, these "legal doctrines have been expanded to allow a
plaintiff to prove malpractice without [expert] testimony" 47 because of
the unavailability of expert testimony.48 As a factual matter, it could
be-and has been--debated whether it is difficult for medical malprac-
tice plaintiffs to obtain competent expert witnesses.49 It seems, however,
that whether there are significant barriers to obtaining expert medical
testimony is essentially a question of fact; it is a question of the type
that courts are quite competent to address. Therefore, if courts are as-
serting and finding that medical malpractice plaintiffs have difficulty in
locating competent expert witnesses to testify in their behalf, it may be
assumed for purposes of analysis that these assertions are true.
But even assuming that significant barriers to obtaining adequate ex-
pert testimony exist, it is nonetheless illogical and unreasonable to deal
with the barriers by acting as if a myriad of medical procedures and
techniques are within the common knowledge and experience of lay
persons. Just because a medical malpractice plaintiff has difficulty in
obtaining expert testimony does not mean that lay juries have common
knowledge to deal with the issues arising from paralysis after receiving
46. See Adamson, Medical Malpractice, Misuse of'Malpractice Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN.
L. REV. 1043 (1962).
47. Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse, and Prognosis of MedicalMalpractice, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
598, 610 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957),
wherein the court noted:
[G]radually the courts awoke to the so-called "conspiracy of silence." No matter how
lacking in skill or how negligent the medical man might be, it was almost impossible to
get other medical men to testify adversely to him in litigation based on his alleged negli-
gence. Not only would the guilty person thereby escape from civil liability for the wrong
he had done, but his professional colleagues would take no steps to insure that the same
results would not again occur at his hands.
49. The ever-increasing mass of cases and commentary on the conspiracy of silence issue
reflects the stakes involved in the debate and the vigor with which the various positions are de-
fended. See the sources cited in supra note 10. See also, Wasmuth, The Conspiracy of Silence:
Physician's View, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 85 (1966).
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cortisone,5" inflamations and thrombosis after receiving medication,5
paralysis after receiving radiation treatment,52 paralysis following
childbirth,53 and the "commonplace procedure" of giving mye-
lograms.5 4 The whole process of turning such questions over to the
jury to decide on the basis of common knowledge because a plaintiff
may have difficulty producing expert testimony on the question is
inconsistent:
On the one hand it is said that because laymen are not knowledgea-
ble about medical problems, it is unfair to impose upon the plaintiff
the responsibility of explaining whether and how something went
wrong in the performance of the medical procedure. But on the
other hand, it is said that because of the increased lay comprehension
of medical matters, the jury will be able to determine whether the
defendant has been negligent without the aid of expert testimony.
55
Of course, courts have not gone so far as to hold that all injuries are
within the realm of common knowledge: paralysis following injections
of novacaine, 56 paralysis following aortography,57 shock following in-
jection of penicillin, 8 and many other situations have been held to be
outside the common knowledge and experience of lay persons.59 The
obvious question that arises after reviewing these cases is what brings
paralysis following radiation or injection of cortisone within the scope
of common knowledge while paralysis following aortography or injec-
tion of novacaine remains outside the scope of common knowledge?
The all too apparent answer is that, in fact, nearly all of the paralysis
cases have equal theoretical bases for applying the common knowledge
doctrine but differing equities in individual cases have prompted courts
to act inconsistently, thereby leaving the landscape of medical malprac-
tice jurisprudence littered with a confusing array of irreconcilable
decisions."0
50. Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal. 3d 784, 478 P.2d 480, 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 (1970).
51. See Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal.2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959).
52. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
53. See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
54. Berkey v. Anderson, I Cal. App.3d 790, 799, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 73 (1969).
55. Meisel, supra note 41, at 71.
56. See LaMere v. Goren, 233 Cal. App.2d 799, 43 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1965).
57. See Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
58. See Campos v. Weeks, 245 Cal. App. 2d 678, 53 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1966).
59. See, e.g., Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962) (fistula
following hysterectomy); Edelman v. Zeigler, 233 Cal. App.2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965) (car-
diac arrest during operation).
60. See Meisel, supra note 41, at 70, 71.
The application of res 0psa loquilur represents a judicial effort to circumvent the unwill-
ingness of.the vast proportion of the medical profession to testify on behalf of patients
injured at the hands of negligent colleagues, and to compensate medical-accident victims
on the basis of the equities of the case rather than in accordance with strict legal rules of
procedure or substance.
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Rather than applying the common knowledge doctrine and res Osa
loquitur indiscriminately in an attempt to compensate for the conspir-
acy of silence and the equities of particular cases, the better course of
action in this troublesome area is to attack the conspiracy itself. Such
an approach would leave the theoretical doctrines of tort law intact
and, in the long run, better enable medical malpractice plaintiffs and
defendants to address the merits of each individual claim. Taking steps
to eliminate the conspiracy of silence is a better course than expanding
the common knowledge and res i'sa loquitur doctrines to include every
case where equities favor the plaintiff because by removing the conspir-
acy, technical and medical information can be given to juries that will
presumably enable them to make fairer decisions. Simply assuming
that lay juries have common knowledge about medical and technical
matters, such as the causes or risk of paralysis after receiving a given
medical treatment, does nothing more than perpetuate the wall of si-
lence and forces decisions to be made without access to necessary and
helpful information.
B. Failure to Distinguish Between Uncommon Injuries
and Common Negligence
The second problem that has emerged in the common knowledge
cases is a failure to distinguish between cases in which persons suffer
injuries that are due to negligence that is within the common knowl-
edge and experience of lay persons and cases in which persons suffer
injuries from a treatment or process that does not ordinarily result in
any injury. This distinction is important because injuries that result
from treatments or processes that do not ordinarily result in injuries
may or may not be the result of negligence. To assume that an injury is
the result of negligence just because it occurred after a process or pro-
cedure that does not ordinarily result in injuries ignores the fact that
there may be many non-negligent causes of the uncommon injury.
The failure to distinguish between uncommon injuries and common
negligence nearly always arises where there is a joint application of res
ipsa loquitur and the common knowledge doctrine. An evaluation of
this distinction, both within and outside the medical context, reveals its
importance. Consider the following situations:
Situation 1: A drives his automobile to work every day without inci-
dent. One day while driving to work, A's automobile is struck by an
automobile operated by B. Given only these facts, is it proper to infer
that B has been negligent and is, therefore, liable to A for the injuries
resulting from the accident? The answer has to be a resounding "No."
While it is clear that A's injuries (damage to his automobile) are of a
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type that ordinarily do not occur from the activity in question (driving
to work), surely more information is necessary to determine whether B
was at fault. Given only the above information, it is impossible to say
that A's injuries are of a sort that ordinarily would not happen unless B
was negligent.6
Situation 2: A and B are parties to a contract. B breaches the con-
tract and A retains attorney C to assist in recovering on the contract. C
subsequently files an action against B on behalf of A but the action is
dismissed because barred by the applicable statute of limitations. A
then brings an action against C for legal malpractice. Given only these
facts, is it proper to infer that C has been negligent and is liable to A?
A has suffered injuries (dismissal of a valid claim against B) that do not
ordinarily arise from the event in question (retention of an attorney to
pursue a claim). But this showing is not enough since A could have
hired C after the statute of limitations had run. The mere fact that A
has suffered a loss that does not ordinarily occur, without more, does
not support an inference that C was negligent.
Situation 3: After feeling pain in his shoulder, A visits B, a physician
who gives A several injections of xylocaine and cortisone. The injec-
tions are very painful to A. After noticing little improvement in the
shoulder, A is subsequently admitted to a hospital and given another
injection by B. Upon examination by C, a different physician, A is
found to have nerve damage and paralysis in his arm and shoulder. A
brings a malpractice action against B. A proves that an injection of
cortisone and xylocaine does not ordinarily cause the sort of pain
which A experienced but does not prove the cause of the paralysis.
From these facts alone, is it proper to infer that B has been negligent?
Again, it is clear that A has suffered injuries of a type that do not usu-
ally occur from the treatment given. But as was illustrated with situa-
tions 1 and 2 above, the mere fact that an injury is a type not ordinarily
experienced is not dispositive. The important question of whether A's
injuries-nerve damage and paralysis-are of a type that are likely to
have been caused by B's actions requires more information than is
given.62
All three of the above situations present cases of "uncommon inju-
61. From the facts given in Situation 1, it is entirely possible that the collision was a result of
A's negligence or was simply "unavoidable." An unavoidable accident is "an occurrence which
was not intended, and which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or pre-
vented by the exercise of reasonable precautions." PROSSER, supra note 1, at 140 (footnote
omitted).
62. But see Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 784, 478 P.2d 480, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1970). In
Bardessono, the court, under the facts given in Situation 3, affirmed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff on the basis of res ipsa loquitur.
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ries": they are cases in which a person was injured from some activity
that does not ordinarily result in injury. The fact that an uncommon
injury occurred may be one factor in determining whether the injury
resulted from negligence but the mere occurrence of an uncommon in-
jury or accident, alone, should never be enough to create an inference
of negligence, either by common knowledge or otherwise. Rather than
focusing on the unusualness of the event, the correct approach is to
focus on the likely cause of injury. Common knowledge and res isa
loquitur are properly applied jointly only in cases where, given the fact
of injury, one can presume from common knowledge and experience
that the injury is due to negligence. To find that an injury is of a sort
that ordinarily does not occur is a far cry from finding that an injury is
due to negligence. Unusual injuries may be caused by the injured per-
son himself, or by a third person not involved in the lawsuit; such inju-
ries may be the result of an act of nature63 or may simply be
unavoidable.'
Despite the apparent necessity for distinguishing between cases in-
volving uncommon injuries and those involving common negligence,
there are numerous reported cases that ignore the distinction. For ex-
ample, in Davis v. MemorialHospital,65 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that a trial court had erred in refusing to give an instruction on
res Osa loquitur in a malpractice case involving a plaintiff who devel-
oped a perirectal abscess and a fistula, allegedly as a result of a
presurgical enema. The record revealed several possible causes of the
abscess, including a prostatic massage that the plaintiff had received by
a different doctor one week before surgery. 66 The court virtually ig-
nored the several possible causes of the injury by holding that
"[a]lthough there was no expert testimony as to the probability of negli-
gence in such a situation, it is a matter of common knowledge among
laymen that the giving of an enema is not ordinarily harmful unless
negligently done."67 Similarly, in Wolfsmith v. Marsh,6 8 the same high
court held that where a malpractice plaintiff developed a thrombosis
after an injection of sodium pentathol, a jury could properly draw an
inference of negligence on the part of the administering physician. In
63. The law has long refused to hold persons liable for injuries that can be attributed to an
act of God or nature. There has been considerable common law development of this principle,
particularly in relation to common carriers, see PROSSER, supra note I, at 284-286, and maritime
accidents, see, e.g., Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, 360 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1966); Twery
v. Houseboat Jilly's Yen, 267 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
64. See supra note 60.
65. 58 Cal.2d 815, 376 P.2d 561, 26 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1962).
66. 58 Cal.2d at 816, 376 P.2d at 562, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
67. Id
68. 51 Cal.2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959).
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so holding, the court explained that "[i]t is a matter of common knowl-
edge among laymen that injections in the arm, . . . as well as other
portions of the body.., do not ordinarily cause trouble unless unskill-
fully done or there is something wrong with the serum."6 9
These decisions, and others like them,7" are fundamentally wrong.
They essentially allow defendants to be held liable because it has been
shown that the defendants were involved in uncommon events. While
such an approach might be supported in a system of liability based
purely on spreading risks or compensating injured persons, it is inher-
ently inconsistent with a system of liability based on fault.
IV. A PROPOSAL: DIRECT ATTACKS ON THE CONSPIRACY OF
SILENCE AND CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE COMMON
KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE
A. Direct Attacks on the Conspiracy of Silence
The common knowledge doctrine operates on an assumption that
there are some acts that appear to fall so far below any acceptable stan-
dard of care that it is unnecessary to require expert testimony to estab-
lish the precise standard of care. Similarly, res ipsa loquitur operates on
an assumption that there are some types of accidents or injuries that are
best explained by inferring negligence on the part of a third person.
While neither of these doctrines were originally developed to deal with
the so-called conspiracy of silence within the medical profession, re-
peated application of the two doctrines, both individually and jointly,
have yielded a powerful weapon to combat the silence.
Unfortunately, assuming that causes of paralysis, inflamations, or
any other medical problem are within the scope of common
knowledge7 and are best explained by negligence neither solves the
conspiracy nor produces consistent malpractice jurisprudence. In fact,
attacking the conspiracy of silence with the common knowledge doc-
trine is inherently inconsistent since the conspiracy presumably exists
because laymen are unable to address specific medical questions while
the common knowledge doctrine assumes the exact opposite.72 More-
over, the attempt to attack the conspiracy of silence through expanded
applications of the common knowledge doctrine and res ipsa loquitur is
counterproductive since the assumption that lay persons have common
knowledge of anything other than the most minor of medical problems
69. Id at 835, 337 P.2d at 72.
70. See, e.g., BaTdessono, 3 Cal.3d 784, 478 P.2d 480, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1970).
71. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
72. Meisel, supra note 41, at 71.
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will almost always be erroneous. In sum, the common knowledge doc-
trine and res ipsa loquitur are very ineffective means of dealing with the
conspiracy of silence.
There are, however, other tools that can and have been used to chip
away at the wall of silence. Some of these tools are changes in the law
that were probably not intended primarily as responses to the wall of
silence. Two changes that have been made by most American jurisdic-
tions are the relaxation of the traditional locality rule73 and the elimi-
nation or relaxation of the school of practice rule. 4  The locality rule
"require[d] that a medical witness, in order to qualify as an expert, [had
to] be a practicing physician in the same community as the defend-
ant. '75 It has been said that "[t]he erosion of the locality rule, perhaps
more than any other change in the law, has made it possible for plain-
tiff to prosecute successfully a malpractice claim."76
The school of practice rule held that a practitioner adhering to one
school of medical thought was not competent to testify in an action
involving a practitioner adhering to a different school.77 The rule also
73. At early common law, a physician was required to adhere to the standard of care that
existed in the locality or community in which he practiced. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 164. Be-
cause the local or community standard of care was the guidepost by which all conduct was mea-
sured, the only competent medical witnesses were practitioners from the same community.
74. The school of practice rule is a second early common law limitation on the qualification
of expert medical witnesses. The rule is often phrased in protective terms-i.e., that a physician
"is entitled" to have his conduct measured against "the school of medicine to which be belongs
and not by those of some other schooL" Wammett v. Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 313, 292 P. 93, 96
(1930).
75. Note, supra note 12, at 338. This rule effectively barred many plaintiffs from obtaining
competent expert testimony by limiting the number of available expert witnesses and by produc-
ing a pool of acceptable witnesses that were likely to be extremely reluctant to testify.
The locality rule evolved at a time when physicians practicing in remote and rural areas did not
have the same access to medical advances, techniques and equipment as did urban doctors. The
rule essentially protected physicians practicing outside urban areas from being held to the un-
doubtedly higher standards that would apply in the major urban areas. An interesting, but fairly
typical, early example of this fact is found in Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880). In that case,
a physician practicing in a small country village was required to perform surgery with which he
was unfamiliar. Alleged negligence in the surgery resulted in injuries to the plaintiff, but the
doctor was held not liable. The court "accepted the fact of the physician's inferior training and
awareness of medical technique, and held him only to the standard of a physician in a similar
locality." Kroll, supra note 47, at 607 n.36.
76. Kroll, supra note 47, at 607. It should be noted that in most instances the relaxation of
the locality rule has been a gradual process. The rule was originally modified during the first half
of this century in most jurisdictions to allow experts from "similar" localities to testify as expert
witnesses. PROssER, supra note 1, at 164; Kroll, supra note 47, at 607-608. More recently, many
jurisdictions have further relaxed the locality rule so that locality is simply considered as one
factor in establishing the standard of care. Some jurisdictions have abandoned the rule altogether.
See PROSSER, supra note I, at 164.
The changes in the locality rule have been brought about both by statute, see, e.g., Wis. STAT.
§147.14(2)(a), and by judicial decision, see, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793
(1968). But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §9:2794(A)(1) (locality rule preserved by statute).
77. The relaxation of the school of practice rule has enabled doctors from different fields and
training to testify as expert witnesses in malpractice actions even though the testimony may not be
conclusive of the applicable standard of care. There are now many reported decisions allowing
medical doctors and osteopaths to testify in actions involving the other. See Comment, 17 U.
MiAmi L. REV. 182 (1962) and cases cited therein. There are even reported cases allowing a
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served to preclude medical specialists from testifying in actions against
a general practitioner, and vice versa, since specialists and general prac-
titioners are generally held to different standards of care.7 The relaxa-
tion of this rule has expanded the pool of available witnesses to testify
in any given action, thereby increasing the likelihood that a malprac-
tice plaintiff will be able to secure expert testimony.79
The arguments for and against the relaxation of the locality rule and
the school of practice rule need not be evaluated here. 0 It is sufficient
to note that the relaxation of these rules has "done much to overcome
the 'wall of silence' that once made medical malpractice actions such
high-risk, low-gain efforts."'" These changes aptly demonstrate the fact
that there are direct methods of increasing the availability of expert
medical testimony.
The relaxation of the locality and school of practice rules is essen-
tially a fait accompli since virtually all American jurisdictions have
abandoned the early common law formulations of the rules.8 2 There
are, however, additional changes in the law that should be considered
as tools to eliminate the barriers resulting from the conspiracy of si-
lence. Two such changes are outlined more fully below.
chiropractor to testify in actions against medical doctors, see, e.g., Wemmett v. Mount, 134 Ore.
305, 292 P. 93 (1930) (involving the use of a diathermy machine), and cases allowing a medical
doctor to testify against a chiropractor, see, e.g., Epstein v. Hirschon, 33 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct.
1942); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937).
The Wemmett case is particularly noteworthy because even under a relaxed view of the school
of practice rule, chiropractors are seldom, if ever, deemed competent to testify as to the standards
expected of medical doctors. Later cases have so held. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Firth, 215 Ore. 268,
334 P.2d 190 (1959).
78. Courts have been reluctant to allow specialists to testify in actions against general practi-
tioners. See Note, supra note 12, at 339. However, some courts are now willing to allow special-
ists to testify in actions involving general practitioners even though the testimony will be directed
to a "lower" standard of care to which the general practitioner will be held. See, e.g., Simone v.
Sabo, 37 Cal.2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951); Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 593, 41 N.W.2d 702 (1950)
citedin Note, supra note 12, at 339.
79. The rule has essentially been relaxed or eliminated by the numerous exceptions to the
rule that are now recognized in most jurisdictions-the most important being the exception for
situations in which various schools would apply the same or similar treatment for a given prob-
lem. A collection of the cases illustrating the exceptions to the rule is found in Annot., 85
A.L.R.2d 1077 (1962).
80. There is conskderable commentary outlining the various arguments relative to the locality
rule and the school or practice rule. See, e.g., Comment, Locality and Standard of Care ofMedical
Practitioners, 25 ARK. L. REv. 169 (1971); Waltz, The Rire and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in
MedicalMapractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408 (1969); Comment, supra note 2.
81. Vogel, supra note 26 at 52.
82. Of course, the modem treatment of the locality rule varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. Most jurisdictions still retain a loose form of the rule whereby the locality is simply consid-
ered as one factor in establishing the standard of care. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 164. There are,
however, jurisdictions that have abandoned the rule altogether. See e.g., Wis. STAT.
§147.14(2)(a); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). At least one jurisdiction
has retained the common law locality rule by statute. See LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §9:2794(A)(1).
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1. Relaxation of the rules of evidence regarding medical treatises.
Medical treatises, like textbooks and treatises from any other field, are
readily available sources of impartial, up-to-date, and specific informa-
tion on the standards of the profession.8 3 Such treatises can be useful
to malpractice plaintiffs either in the absence of expert witnesses or in
the course of cross examination of the defendant's medical witnesses.
However, until recently, medical treatises and textbooks could not be
admitted into evidence under any circumstances in virtually all Ameri-
can jurisdictions and could not be used in cross examination unless the
expert acknowledged his familiarity with, and based his opinions upon,
the particular treatise to be used in the examination."4 This limited use
of medical treatises was a logical application of the rule prohibiting
hearsay evidence. Since the author of a medical textbook or treatise
would not be present testifying under oath and was not available for
cross-examination, the declarations found in such books would be
hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.
One of the obvious benefits of allowing greater use of medical books
in litigation is the increased availability of medical and technical infor-
mation that may be presented to a trier of fact. Medical textbooks and
treatises are often available to substitute for or help clarify medical tes-
timony. Although there can be problems with the use of such text-
books and treatises-i.e., a party or the jury may improperly take
material out of context-many legal commentators are convinced that
the advantages of allowing greater use of such books far outweigh the
possible abuses. Indeed, two of the most prominent commentators on
the law of evidence-Wigmore and McCormick-both "favored the
admissibility of learned treatises. 8 5
In the last few decades, several jurisdictions, including the federal
courts, have modified their rules of evidence to allow greater use of
medical treatises and textbooks. Although most of the reforms go only
so far as to allow attorneys to examine witnesses on the contents of any
83. It has sometimes been asserted that books are often not current enough to be used in
litigation, especially in matters requiring state-of-the-art information. This objection carries little
significance if, as common sense dictates, out-of-date materials are considered irrelevant and inad-
missible. In short, "It]he lament heard by witnesses that textbooks are 'out of date' by the time
printed (a statement which is undoubtedly true in part), is easily correctible in an age where
computer retrieval can provide rapidly updated information on any issue." Leonard, supra note
26, at 411.
84. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1690 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); FED. R. EVID. 803, Notes of
Advisory Comm. ("iTihe great weight of authority has been that learned treatises are not admissi-
ble as substantive evidence although usable in the cross-examination of experts."). There are
some states that do allow a treatise to be used where the witness has expressly stated his reliance
on the treatise. See, e.g., Drucker v. Philadelphia Dairy Prod. Co., 35 Cal. 437, 166 A. 796 (1933);
Percoco's Case, 273 Mass. 429, 173 N.E. 515 (1930); People v. McKernan, 236 Mich. 226, 210
N.W. 219 (1926).
85. FED. R. Evm. 803, Notes of Advisory Comm.
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relevant book or treatise, 86 others allow such material to be admitted
and to constitute direct evidence.87 Such changes have been made both
by judicial decisions88 and by statute.89 However, jurisdictions that
have recognized such an exception to the hearsay rule remain a distinct
minority.
2. Creation of medical boards of review. One of the most innova-
tive-and controversial-steps that has been taken in light of the con-
spiracy of silence controversy has been the creation of local boards or
panels of medical review that evaluate claims of medical malpractice
against physicians who practice within the given geographical reach of
the board. As of last year, it was reported that some twenty-five states
have developed some type of pretrial malpractice screening mechanism
and another eleven states have established arbitration procedures for
malpractice claims.90 Although the functions and procedures of the
state boards vary, some boards guarantee to provide competent expert
testimony for "valid" claims of medical malpractice if the claim leads
to litigation.91 This unique feature of the pretrial screening process has
the potential of nullifying completely any conspiracy of silence that
might exist.
The potential benefits, and disadvantages, of the pretrial screening
86. See, e.g., FED. R. EVIDENCE 803 (18).
87. See, e.g., Stone v. Proctor, 131 S.E.2d 297 (N.C. 1963).
88. See id
89. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 233, §79C; NEV. REV. STAT. §41A.100; Wis. STAT.
§147.14. The text of the Nevada statute is discussed in the text at infra note 94. The Massachu-
setts statute illustrates the approach that has been taken by those states that have chosen to deal
with the textbook and treatise question by statute. That statute provides:
A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained in a published
treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the court, and if the court
finds that it is relevant and that the writer of such statement is recognized in his profes-
sion or calling as an expert on the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for
malpractice, error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospi-
tals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said fact or as opinion evidence; pro-
vided, however, that the party intending to offer as evidence any such statement shall,
not less than three days before the trial of the action, give the adverse party notice of
such intention, stating the name of the writer of the statement and the title of the treatise,
periodical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 233, §79C.
90. Leonard, su.pra note 26, at 413.
91. The functions of a typical board of review program is illustrated by the Pima County
Screening Plan in Arizona, as outlined in Lesher, Pima County Screening Plan, 17 ARIz.
MEDICINE 379 (1960). Under that program any malpractice claimant can petition the Pima
County Bar Association's Medico-Legal Committee.to review the claim.. Upon receipt of any such
petition, the Committee will call and form a panel of nine doctors and nine lawyers which will, at
a formal hearing conducted after notice to both parties, review the claim. Both the claimant and
the doctor have opportunities to present their cases, and are subject to cross-examination before
the panel. If upon reviewing the evidence the panel finds that there is "substantial evidence of
malpractice" and "substantial evidence of substantial injury arising out of this malpractice," the
local medical society agrees to provide expert testimony for the claimant if the case goes to trial. If
the panel does not find that there has been malpractice or injury, the claimant is still free to pursue
his malpractice action but the medical society is under no obligation to provide expert testimony.
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process are fairly obvious. On the one hand, a claimant who has suf-
fered injury as a result of medical malpractice may be able to show a
board of review that malpractice has indeed occurred and thereby as-
sure himself of competent expert testimony at trial. On the other hand,
it may be difficult to convince a panel of doctors that malpractice has
occurred; such panels may be "dramatically unfair to claimants." 92 If a
claimant fails to convince a panel of doctors that malpractice has oc-
curred, the entire panel of doctors becomes potential expert witnesses
for the doctor-defendant in any resulting litigation. Moreover, the pro-
cess itself may become a second trial, creating "[m]onumental expendi-
tures of time and effort."9 3
However, all of the objections to the screening process are overcome
if the process is neither mandatory nor binding on the claimant. Under
such a system, a claimant could have his day in court with or without
going through the screening process but the process would be available
to serve the valuable function of assuring expert testimony to plaintiffs
with meritorious claims who elect to use the process.
It is difficult to conclude definitively that medical boards of review
will have the effect of eliminating the perceived conspiracy of silence.
But assuming that such boards will make fair determinations of
whether malpractice claims are meritorious, the boards will at least
give the potential plaintiffs who utilize the process an opportunity to
proceed to trial, if necessary, with qualified and competent expert
witnesses.
B. Consistent Application of the Common Knowledge Doctrine
In connection with the direct attack on the conspiracy of silence, the
common knowledge doctrine should be limited to those cases where it
can properly be assumed that the type of accident or injury involved in
the case is within the common knowledge of lay persons. The fact that
a few or even a majority of lay persons are familiar with a medical
technique or process should not be sufficient to invoke the common
knowledge doctrine. Although there may be gray areas where it can be
fairly doubted whether the lay public has common knowledge of a
given medical procedure, there are some types of cases where common
knowledge is clearly appropriate.94
The State of Nevada has enacted a statute that reflects a consensus
within that jurisdiction on the types of injuries that may be deemed
92. See id
93. Leonard, supra note 26, at 414.
94. Id at 415.
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fairly to lie within the common knowledge and experience of most lay
persons. The statute provides that medical evidence, in the form of
either expert testimony, recognized medical texts or treatises, or regula-
tions of the health care facility where the injury occurred, is required in
all cases involving alleged negligence in the providing of medical serv-
ices except in cases where:
1. A foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic de-
vice was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following
surgery;
2. An explosion or fire originating in a substance used in treat-
ment occurred in the course of treatment;
3. An unintended burn caused by heat, radiation or chemical was
suffered in the course of medical care;
4. An injury was suffered during the course of treatment to a part
of the body not directly involved in such treatment or proximate
thereto; or
5. A surgical procedure was performed on the wrong patient or
the wrong organ, limb or part of a patient's body.95
The statute thus limits the common knowledge doctrine to the sort of
blatant blunder cases that had been developed by the common law but
expands the sources of acceptable "expert testimony" to include medi-
cal books and treatises and health care facility regulations.
Enactment of a Nevada-type statute in all jurisdictions would be a
positive first step in the direction of maintaining a consistent and logi-
cal common knowledge doctrine while at the same time breaking down
the barriers of the perceived medical silence. The approach taken by
the Nevada Legislature reflects a genuine effort to deal directly with the
institutional barriers confronting a malpractice plaintiff by expressly al-
lowing a plaintiff to meet his burden of establishing a standard of care
by producing either medical treatises or medical texts or established
medical regulations that address proper standards and procedures. The
approach also seeks to maintain a coherent and sensible common
knowledge doctrine by limiting the use of that doctrine to situations in
95. NEV. REV. STAT. §41A.100. The statute, in its entirety, provides:
Liability for personal injury or death shall not be imposed upon any provider of
medical care based on alleged negligence in the performance of such care unless evi-
dence consisting of expert medical testimony, material from recognized medical texts or
treatises or the regulations of the licensed health care facility wherein the alleged devia-
tion from the accepted standard of care in the specific circumstances of the case and to
prove causation of the alleged personal injury or death, except that such evidence con-
sisting of expert medical testimony, text or treatise material or facility regulations is not
required and a rebuttable presumption that the personal injuries or death was caused by
negligence arises where evidence is presented that the personal injury or death occured
in any one or more of the following circumstances:
I. [The statute enumerates the five categories quoted in the text.]
NEv. REv. STAT. §41A.100.
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which practically all lay persons would have common knowledge or
experience pertaining to the type of accident in question. This ap-
proach is far superior to simply dealing with the conspiracy of silence
by assuming lay juries have common knowledge about every variety of
medical procedures because it enables a claimant to proceed to trial
even if he is unable to persuade medical witnesses to testify, and it
assures that the jury will have at least some information on medical
questions it must decide.
The Nevada statute also solves the recurring problem found in ex-
isting case law96 of courts failing to distinguish between uncommon
injuries and common negligence. In the absence of such a statute,
many courts have focused on the fact that an injury is uncommon-
that is, that it does not ordinarily occur during the activity in ques-
tion-rather than on the fact that certain types of negligence are within
the common knowledge and experience of lay persons.97 Such an ap-
proach is illogical because it fails to recognize that there are many un-
common injuries that are the result of factors other than the negligence
of a particular defendant. By explicitly enumerating the situations in
which the common knowledge doctrine is appropriate, the statute elim-
inates this problem because courts will have to focus on whether an
injury falls within the categories of common knowledge situations
rather than on the question of whether an injury is unusual.98 Al-
though one could quibble with the number or types of common knowl-
edge situations listed in the statute, the Nevada approach should be
commended and followed by other jurisdictions.99
V. CONCLUSION
Common sense dictates that not every injury occurring in a medical
context has a complex medical or technical explanation. The common
knowledge doctrine is simply a legal recognition of this fact.
However, application of the common knowledge doctrine by the
courts has been far more complex than the doctrine's simple justifica-
tion for two reasons. First, courts have insisted on using the doctrine,
especially in conjunction with res 0psa loquitur, in their battle against
the medical profession's wall of silence. Such an application has
96. See text and notes relating to the blatant blunder cases at notes supra 13-19.
97. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
98. The three hypothetical fact situations and related cases discussed in the text and notes at
supra notes 60-69 illustrate the problems with focusing on uncommon injuries.
99. The Nevada statute might be faulted because it codifies what is perceived to be the ex-
isting state of common knowledge and fails to take into account the likely future increases in the
public's awareness of medical matters. But, of course, statutes are no more immune from change
than is the public's common knowledge.
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proven to be counterproductive because the common knowledge doc-
trine and res ipsa loquitur can never solve the problem underlying the
wall of silence-a lack of information available to plaintiffs and triers
of fact. Second, courts have sought to define and apply common
knowledge, again usually in conjunction with res ipsa loquitur, based
upon the "commonness" of the injury. But this approach is entirely
inconsistent and illogical since an uncommon injury may or may not be
within the common knowledge and experience of lay persons and may
or may not be caused by negligence.
Statutory responses to the inconsistent and illogical application of
the common knowledge doctrine, such as the Nevada statute, are com-
mendable and appropriate. Doctors, patients, courts and the public
will all be served by taking whatever direct steps are necessary to over-
come the wall of silence while retaining a well-defined and coherent
common knowledge doctrine.
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